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Abstract  
In this paper the issues from the personnel economics has been investigated. The issues such as 
training of workers from Becker’s human capital theory and their association with the workers’ 
productivity. In the second part of the paper the issue of grooming has been investigated in relation 
with earnings for which there exist and it is presented empirical evidence. In the equation as 
regressors are also present Mincerian variables: age, marital status and others. Also the four puzzles 
in the empirical literature about the determinants of earnings has been investigated. And how the 
empirical literature helps in resolving them.  
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1. Investigation of the two puzzles which Becker’s human capital theory of training does 
not explain. Examination whether the presence of oligopsony and asymmetric information 
resolves them? 
 
Becker’s human capital theory recognizes two types of training- general and specific. General training 
is transferable across companies as individuals change jobs, worker   gets all   the returns and he is 
the one that finances the training. Table 1.12  row 1clarifies that according to human capital theory 
in perfect competition, there is no difference between wages and the productivity during the 
training in period of lower productivity workers are compensated by lower wages and afterwards 
they are compensated by higher wages. Post-training wages are same across the subsequent firms 
as they are in the current firm. Specific training increases productivity only in the current firm. In 
row 3 from table 1 firm and the worker share the cost and the returns of the training investment 
to avoid hold-up problems. Wages are above the productivity during the training and below 
marginal productivity after the training. Because it is not transferable across the firms wages at 
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subsequent firms are lower than marginal productivity. In row 2 from table 1 human capital theory 
recognizes divergence between wages and net marginal productivity when firms decide to participate 
in financing of general training when workers face credit constraints i.e. they are not able to 
borrow. Firm pays workers more than marginal productivity during the training and less 
afterwards. Firm acts as lender, but in a situation only if there is apprenticeship contract, to bind 
the workers after the training until the loan has been paid back. And second puzzle that cannot be 
explained within the human capital theory framework is that workers do not receive wage cuts during 
the training. Theory of oligopsony provides insights that can explain these two puzzles. According 
to the classical theory of oligopsony firms have market power in setting the wages because they 
are the only employer. By the new theory oligopsony arises through product differentiation and 
imperfect information. Product differentiation  requires from workers ,working in such companies to 
possess specific skills which increases the costs of mobility of workers and workers ,and workers 
do not have incentives to invest in general training. Asymmetric information exists in case when firm 
knows the value of its general training but other firms do not. If outsiders assign zero value to the 
training –such training is in effect specific for the training firm. As, post productivity returns to 
training are higher than  wage returns, firms find profitable to pay for the general training as can 
be seen in fig1 and in column 5 from table 1.1. 
Figure 1 Post productivity returns to training are higher than wage returns 
0
workers 
productivity f(τ)
Wages
W(t)=f(t)-
∆(t)
τ  
 In Oligopsonistic labour market wages are lower than marginal productivity. 
2. Can economics analysis provide additional insights into why workers “invest” in 
grooming? What are the main limitations of this analysis? 
 Economics literature has focused almost exclusively on the effect of innate (exogenous) beauty 
on market outcomes; other disciplines have considered effect on grooming as (endogenous) aspect 
of physical appearance to be important to all the manners of social and economic life. Businesses 
recognize the importance of what the literature refers to as “personal branding”. Grooming can 
provide powerful market signals. Workers who spend more effort grooming will enjoy more 
favourable market outcomes. The wage regression of an individual 𝑖 of gender type j is given 
by: ln𝑊𝑗𝑖 = 𝑋1𝑗𝑖Γ1j + X2jiΓ2j + βjlnGji + Uji, j = male, female  here lnW is the log of weekly wages for 
males and females working full time, (35 hours or more per week) 𝑋𝑖 is the matrix of Mincerian 
human capital determinants like age, marital status,X2 represents the matrix of controls for 
location, industry occupation. G represents the time spent on personal grooming. In general 
represents the time spent by workers on washing, dressing. β , represents the marginal returns in 
weekly wages to time spent grooming. By introducing grooming in its log form the model allows 
for diminishing returns. It is expected β > 0  and the time allocated to grooming is endogenous, 
grooming habits are determined in the culture. And β will be biased upward if higher wages lead 
to more grooming, and biased towards zero if increase wages cause less grooming. Second 
equation is therefore grooming equation lnGji = IjiΓ3j + αjlnWji + Eji, j = male, female  I represents 
matrix of exogenous variables that determine the time spent on grooming (personal traits), and 
wages in log. Two types of factors are considered (1) household characteristics (2) other activities 
with ones social life. In tables 4 & 53 results are obtained by 2SLS and generalized method of 
moments and (GMM).In table 4, 3068 observations version of first (i) using log of grooming as 
an explanatory variable (ii) adding a dummy interaction to account for possible racial disparities 
regarding the returns to grooming, in table 5 there are 2837 observations, and in the two tables 
standard theoretical predictions are confirmed. The returns to age, which proxy labour experience 
are positive statistically significant in the early years, but negative in later years negative sign 
on AGE2 100⁄ .Whites earn more than their minority counterparts, education contributes 
positively to earnings. Marriage has positive effect on men’s wages but has no significant effect on 
those of women. Extra time spent on grooming has positive significant effect for men that earn 
5% higher wages; this coefficient is positive but insignificant for women’s earnings. There is also 
week evidence than the returns to grooming by race for males and females. One problem with this 
analysis is the weak instruments and the second is the validity of instruments, IVs must not be 
correlated with wages. To test validity of the IVs it is used Hansen J (distributed χ2) and 
heteroscedasticity problem which should be corrected in the first stage by OLS to use the 2SLS if 
not GMM should be used. Also, coefficient on grooming may be biased because grooming and 
beauty may be correlated. 
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 3. What are the four puzzles which Bowles et al. (2001) identify in the empirical literature 
on the determinants of earnings? In what sense are they “puzzles”? 
 First, apparently similar individuals receive quite different earnings. The puzzle is to understand 
how in the standard earning equation for the individuals of the same race ,sex, between 2/3 and 
4/5 of the variance of natural logarithm  of hourly wages of individuals is explained by a person’s 
age ,year of schooling ,occupation, and income. Second puzzle is to understand, what is that 
successful parent’s pass on to their children that gives them labour market advantages beyond the 
superior schooling, or cognitive scores measured in available studies. Third puzzle is to explain 
why apparently irrelevant personal traits (beauty, height, and obesity) are often robust predictors 
of earnings. Fourth puzzle is to explain why the apparent impact of school resources on earnings 
might be so different from their apparent effects on subsequent earnings. On survey of 3,000 
employers the most important was the “attitude” and “communication skills” compared with the 
“years of schooling” and “academic performance”. The second example in a Survey 1,693 British 
employers identify   “poor attitude, motivation or personality” as recruitment problem in 62% of 
the cases, while “lack of technical skills” in 43% .The third empirical example is from a series of 
studies on the labour market impact of the GED, a diploma gained by a test of cognitive skills 
taken by a large fraction of dropouts from US high schools.  Heckman and his co-authors reason 
that GED is mixed signal indicating to the employers that the individual had cognitive skill to 
complete high school but lacked the motivational or behavioural requisites. These examples 
illustrate a possible bias, “skill shortages” when there is difficulty in recruiting suitable employees. 
And second bias is the presumption that anything rewarded in a competitive labour market must 
be a skill. Model in which trait that is not skill may be rewarded in a competitive labour market. If 
disequilibrium rents   arising from technological shocks are persistent and if labour services are 
not subject to costless enforceable contracts, individual behavioural traits unrelated to productive 
capacities may bear a positive price. 
4.  Interpretation of the meaning of Bowles et al.’s term “incentive enhancing 
preferences” .And to what extent, the behavioural model can resolve the puzzles 
identified in Question 3. 
Coasean traits are defined as “incentive enhancing preferences” including such personality traits as a 
sense of efficacy avoiding disruptive behaviour, as determinants of earnings. They do not 
contribute directly to the production and they are in the Coasean model of earnings, determination 
which has been explored by sociologists that frequently stress the non-skilled related determinants 
of earnings and of the contribution of schooling to the economy. Increase in” incentive enhancing 
preferences “will lead an employee to work harder. Examples of “incentive enhancing preferences “are: 
individual’s evaluations, of the prospect of retaining the job in the future, efficacy as opposite of 
fatalism (incentive depressing trait), and third example is desirability of holding the job. In table 24 are 
presented results from: (NLSYW) National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women and National 
Child Development Study (NCDS) both data sets are presented in two columns one for the 
extended human capital model; and another one for behavioural model .In column A the estimated 
signs of the variables (years of education, IQ score, Years of work experience, Parental SES) are 
positive consistent with the literature, number of children variable is with negative sign. In column 
B are presented results from the behavioural model which includes exogenous instrument for 
personality. Roter score has negative sign so that the belief that outcomes are the results of fate or 
luck has negative influence on earnings. Other variables have same signs as in model of Column 
A with a slight decrease in the size and they are statistically significant except Parental SES which 
is insignificant. This model is applied on 915 observations. In columns C and D coefficients on 
personality variables are significant and suggest that 1% deviation change in aggression is associated 
with almost 8% decrease in wages, and 1% decrease in withdrawal is associated with over 3% 
decrease in wages. The increase in variance from including personality is larger than the mean 
increase in explained variance from including cognitive scores to wage determination. This model 
has 1123 observations. Results in table 3 5show that, in high status column one standard deviation 
increase in aggression of women decrease women’s earnings by more than 7%, while the same 
change is associated with an average increase in men’s earnings by almost 15%. One standard 
deviation increase in withdrawal is associated with a decrease in men’s wages by 17% and 15% for 
high and low status occupations, respectively. For, women changes in withdrawal are associated 
with a 6% increase in wages for high status women and 6% decrease in wages for women in low 
status occupations. The model provides following solution to the puzzles identified in question 3. 
First the unexplained variance in the standard earnings function is due in part to individual 
differences in behavioural traits that are rewarded on labour markets. Second, the contribution of 
schooling and parental socioeconomic status to earnings is in part explained by earnings-enhancing 
behaviours learned or genetically transmitted from parents, or by additional years of schooling. 
Third, the apparent labour market returns to such traits as good housekeeping and slim figures 
reflect the co variation of these traits with behaviours sought by employers. Finally contradictory 
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evidence on the effectiveness of school resources may not be puzzle at all. If incentive –enhancing 
preferences and other behavioural traits are important determinants of earnings, and some of these 
are fostered by higher quality schooling, enhanced school resources may have important effects 
on subsequent earnings without having large significant effects on cognitive achievement. 
 
5. Summary  
 
Personnel economics has been widely defined as an application of mathematical approaches, 
econometric statistical methods to the questions of human resource management, Lazear (2008). 
This essay reviewed some of the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject of training 
earnings and grooming as well as mincerian related variables to wages. Finally, the main founds 
are : as, post productivity returns to training are higher than  wage returns, firms find profitable to 
pay for the general training, the returns to age, which proxy labour experience are positive 
statistically significant in the early years, but negative in later years negative sign on AGE2 100⁄ . 
Whites earn more than their minority counterparts, education contributes positively to earnings. 
Marriage has positive effect on men’s wages but has no significant effect on those of women. Extra 
time spent on grooming has positive significant effect for men that earn 5% higher wages; this 
coefficient is positive but insignificant for women’s earnings. If disequilibrium rents   arising from 
technological shocks are persistent and if labour services are not subject to costless enforceable 
contracts, individual behavioural traits unrelated to productive capacities may bear a positive price. 
If incentive –enhancing preferences and other behavioural traits are important determinants of 
earnings, and some of these are fostered by higher quality schooling, enhanced school resources 
may have important effects on subsequent earnings without having large significant effects on 
cognitive achievement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1   Some predictions of human capital theory  
Row      Model                       who pays           Divergence between wages                    Transferability of 
No.                                                                (w) and Net marginal Productivity at         Training 
                                                                       Training firm 
[1]       Perfect competition,       Worker                None                                                    Fully transferable 
            general training 
[2]       As above but with credit   Sharing            w>MP during training and                Transferable but wage     
           Constraints                                               w<MP after training                          returns elsewhere 
Greater than returns at                                                 
firm providing training 
[3]        Perfect competition         Sharing              w>MP during training                      Non-transferable 
             Specific training                                        W<MP after training 
[4]        Perfect competition,         Sharing             w>MP during training                     Partially transferable; 
             Mix of general and                                     W<MP after training                     wage returns elsewhere  
             Specific training                                                                                                 less than returns at firm  
[5]       Oligopolistic labour              Firm                   W<MP  during and after training       Fully transferable  
            Market, general                                             implying rents for the firm          wage returns elsewhere  
            Training                                                                                                        greater than returns at firm  
Appendix 2 
Table 4 : Male Wage regressions (n=3068)  
Method:                                                                                  2SLS                                    2SLS 
Variables                                            Coeff                                    Coeff 
                                                        (Std.Error)                              (Std Error) 
LnGROOMING                                                0.047*                                  0.188* 
                                                                                                          (0.023)                        (0.082) 
LnGROOMING*WHITE                                                             -                                       -0.161 
                                                                                                                                               (0.085)                                   
AGE                                                                                              0.065**                             0.066** 
                                                                                                     (0.007)                                    (0.007) 
AGE2/100                                                      -0.067**                               -0.067** 
                                                                                                     (0.008)                                  (0.007) 
WHITE                                                    0.140**                                    0.603** 
                                                                                                   (0.033)                                     (0.260) 
NOHIGH                                                     -0.304**                                   -0.320** 
                                                                                                 (0.035)                                          (0.036) 
SOMECOLL 0.097**
 0.078** 
                                                                                              (0.025)                                             (0.028) 
COLLEGE 0.399**
 0.384** 
 (0.031) 
 (0.031) 
MARRIED 0.150**
 0.146** 
 (0.020)
 (0.021) 
Pagan-Hall’s      𝜒2(32)                                                     30.845                                             49.961 
Centered R2                                                                                              0.3915                                                0.3796     
 
These * and ** represent statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Female Wage regressions (n=2837)  
Method:                                                   GMM                                    GMM 
Variables                                            Coeff                                    Coeff 
                                                        (Std.Error)                              (Std Error) 
LnGROOMING                                   0.023                                         0.066 
                                                                (0.027)                                 (0.070) 
LnGROOMING*WHITE                             -                                   -0.054 
                                                                                                             (0.075)                                   
AGE                                                      0.059**                                 0.058** 
                                                                (0.006)                                  (0.006) 
AGE2/100                                   -0.059**                                -0.059** 
                                                             (0.007)                                      (0.007) 
WHITE                                                  0.051**                                     0.236** 
                                                           (0.024)                                       (0.256) 
NOHIGH                                     -0.281**                                    -0.126** 
                                                          ( 0.045)                                        (0.046) 
SOMECOLL                                      0.128**                                       0.126**                              
                                                          (0.027)                                         (0.027) 
COLLEGE                                         0.477**                                        0.476** 
                                                          (0.031)                                           (0.030) 
MARRIED                                       -0.017                                           -0.008 
                   (0.019)                                          (0.019) 
Pagan-Hall's      𝜒2(32)                   50.637**                                  53.434** 
Centered R2                                 0.3689                                      0.3649                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3  
 Table 2 Conventional and Behavioural Wage Equations  
 
NLYSW NCDS 
extended human capital 
model A 
behavioural model B 
extended human capital 
model C 
behavioural model D 
Variable: b(stat)  b' b(stat) b' b(stat) b' b (stat) b' 
Years of education 
0.079(10.467)                                            
0.196 
0.071 (6.299)                 
0.179 
0.108(9.638)                                      
0.204 
0.104(9.264)              
0.197 
IQ Score 
0.066 (4.937)                                       
0.081 
0.063 (4.789)                 
0.077 
0.006(2.996)                                      
0.058 
0.014 (2.626)              
0.056 
"O" Exams 
completed* 
  
0.018(3.258)                                      
0.071 
0.0019 (0.861)          
0.018 
Years of work 
experience 
0.0092  
(2.399)                                     
0.035 
0.0083  
(2.172)              
 0.032 
  
Parental SES 
0.0095  
(1.476)                                     
0.025 
0.0087  
(1.365)          
      0.023 
** ** 
Number of children 
- 0.073  
(-6.278)                                  
-0.096 
- 0.072 
(-6.299)            
   -0.094 
  
Rotter score  
-0.028 
 (-4.481)          
     -0.067 
  
Aggression    
- 0.098  
(-3.912)         
 - 0.076 
Withdrawal    
- 0.040  
(-2.127)        
 - 0.033 
Adjusted R2 0.327 0.341 0.245 0.259 
Observations 915 915 1123 1123 
 
   Notes: All regressions include a constant and are white females actively employed in the year that wages are  
   Measured (from Osborne 2000)  
*”0” level exams indicate the number of completed Ordinary Level Exams to age 21. 
   ** Socioeconomic status is also included in the model; however, it is not reported here because it is not statistically significant, in 
either model.         
 
 
 
 
Table 3              Returns to Distinct Personality Factors, Aggression and Withdrawal, 
                                         By Sex and Predicted Occupational Status  
  High Status Low Status 
  
Aggression b (t-stat) 
b' 
Withdrawal b (t-stat)                      
b' 
Aggression b (t-stat) 
b' 
Withdrawal b (t-stat)                      
b' 
Men 
0.199 
(5.199) 
0.145 
- 0.209 
(-6.196)                                  
- 0167 
- 0.079 
(-4.599) 
- 0.090 
- 0.188 
(-8.375)                                   
-0.149 
Women 
- 0.139 
(-3.023) 
- 0.072 
0.098 
(2.578)                                        
0.060 
- 0.057 
(-1.216) 
- 0.052 
- 0.053 
(-1.354)                                 
- 0.056 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are for white women actively employed in 
1991 when wages are measured. The dependent variable is the natural log of self-disclosed hourly 
wages in   in 1991, when respondents were 33 years of age. The coefficients b’ represents the 
percentage change in   wages from a one standard deviation change in the independent variable 
(b’x=bxσx) 
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